of techniques with which to assess the reasonableness of fighter performance goals for the future.
The process of formulating realistic and achiev-II. Approach for Measuring able air vehicle performance goals for future Performance Advances fighter aircraft involves considerable uncertainties for the military aviation planner. Usually Development of Approach his decisionmaking base includes the demonstrated performance of past and present fighters designed Past research successfully developed a quantito meet a variety of mission requirements, assesstative technique for measuring technological adments of progress in disparate individual techvance in aircraft turbine engines. 1 Retaining nology areas, and the expectations of airplane the essential features of that approach, subsemanufacturers about how they can integrate the inquent research has extended its application to the dividual technological advances into actual flight fighter sir vehicle as a whole. While a detailed hardware.
Using this and other information, the exposition on the d~velopment of the approach is planner tries to arrive at an appropriate mix of reported elsewhere, we will try to highlight some emphasis on air vehicle, avionics, and armament of its more salient features here before illusperformance in specifying his service's requiretrating its applications. ments. The expectation of a particular level of performance should carry with it an acknowledgment
To measure the rate of performance advance reof the amount of technical risk associated with quired the development of quantitative expressions developing a vehicle having that performance.
that characterized the level of air vehicle Although wider considerations sometimes dictate performance and provided a temporal measure otherwise, that perceived risk should influence of when the performance was achieved. The fact the structure of the development program (e.g., a that designers frequently trade off performance in program with considerable technical risk might one area (e.g., combat) to satisfy mission requireinclude a prototype demonstration while a low-risk ments in another area (e.g., cruise) pointed to the program might move directly to a vehicle having desirability of having a quantitative framework a near-operational configration).
that s 4 multaneously considered the multiparameter tradeoffs imposed by the development process, Obviously, misinterpretation of the levels of rather than considering trends in each performance technical risk can and has led to inappropriate area separately. That led to an expression having structuring of major weapon system acquisition the form: programs, often to the detriment of cost, schedule, and performance goals. With today's intense t-f(P P competition for defense resources, and the lower n rate of introduction of new fighter aircraft, the with t the time when a particular jet fighter airconsequences of misinterpreting risks assume craft appeared and the Ps the set of n"Rerformance greater importance. indicate when a particular level of performance has been achieved. After considering several alternatives, we elected to use first flight date, Table 1 Fighter Air Vehicle Performance generally, although not exclusively using the Parameters first flight date of the development test aircraft, since it usually establishes basic air vehicle performance and includes most of the fully engineered systems for the production vehicle. Because the sequence of fighter aircraft development has varied from program to program, we could not always consistently apply this rule, and hence, had to make some subjective decisions about appropriate first flight dates for some of the aircraft. The equations seemingly exhibit excellent exmance advance (e.g., deceleration, constant, acplanatory powers, but do have some weaknesses. celeration). We evaluated various logarithmic and Limitations in the descriptive power of their varlinear expressions in the dependent variable and iables and the sizable standard errors of estimate the independent variables to cover a spectrum of make them unsuitable for making subtle distincpossibilities, tions between similar fighter designs. The small sample size contributes to some instability in the Applying tests for intuitive engineering reasonequations and the importance of the propulsion ableness, statistical quality, and predictive system in determining combat performance contriproperties, we estimated the performance trend exbutes to higher than desirable levels of correlapressions shown In Table 2 from a sample of 25 Air tion between specific power and sustained load
Force and Navy jet fighter aircraft developed since factor. It seems likely that the inevitably mll the mid-1940e. The log-linear expressions each sample of jet fighter aircraft, the uneven distrihave two variables describing performance in the bution of their first flight events through time, combat arena and two describing performance in and a historically broad definition of what congetting to the combat arena. Specific power, the stitutes a fighter aircraft will make it extremely power per pound the air vehicle develops, used by difficult to significantly improve the precision Gabrielli and von Karman in a landmark paper long and descriptiveness of these expressions. Despite ago, provides a crude measure of speed and accelthese shortcomings, considerable testing has indieration capability. Sustained load factor cated that the expressions can still play a useful directly measures maneuverability. The carrier role in measuring gross trends in performance. 2 capability variable corrects for differences Today we would regard the jet fighter air vehicle These results prompt two observations. First, as a aturing technology. When considering only they reinforce the importance of the propulsion the trend established by aircraft developed through system in establishing the rate of performance the F-C'4A, America's first operational aach 2 advance. Second, it seems unlikely in today's fighter, a separate analysis indicated that perenvironw-nt of engine options that derivative airformance had at least advanced at a constant rate craft will often match the rate of air vehicle and perhaps even accelerated. Many new designs performance advance achievable by a new design.
were intraduced during this period as designers Nonetheless, enhancements in operational per~r.:-sought to exploit new innovations spawned by World mance offered by advancements in avionics or armaWar II, the Korean conflict, and the onset of the ment technology, or more subtle yet valuable imCold War. We suspect, but do not have enough data provements in air vehicle performance than those points to fully quantify, that the performance adquantified by Eq. (1) may still offer c;nxsiderable vance curve for jet fighters is probably followjustification for the development of derivative ing the classical "S" shaped curve characteristic aircraft, of so Many other techno'ogies.
The Rate of Performance Advance Through Time index of performance. For present purposes the c ra pnwhty)
In Fig. 3 , the F-4C has a lower performance index Fint flight dote yVar) rating (i.e., calculated first flight date) than the F-4, primarily because it did not retain a carrier capability. An extrapolation of present trends shown in Fig. 4 Fig. 6 Fighter engine cost trend uncertainty associated with this projection is not only a product of the uncertainty of the approach itself but also of the development process. In any case, this projection raises some provocative questions about whether we have a much leverage in the air vehicle performance area as we once had. mance advance. Similar, although less persuasive cost trends are depicted in Fig. 6 , which illusTrends in Fighter Airframe and Engine Costs trates the rate of increase in fighter engine program costs per pound of thrust. If indeed cost is Some might suggest that a relaxation in cost one of the major factors constraining air vehicle constraints could increase the slope of the perperformance advance, can we afford to increase the formance advance curve in Fig. 4 . Certainly some rate of advance today, even if nothing else stymies contemporary fighter development programs like the us? F-16 and F-18 have made modest performance sacrifices to reduce costs. Quantifying the role of cost in shaping the performance advance curve IV. Observations remains a highly desirable but as yet unachieved ojective, although some of the trends in fighter When expressing fighter air vehicle performance airframe and engine costs do suggest a linkage.
i terms of speed/acceleration, maneuverability, For example, in terms of airframe program costs cruise efficiency, and payload carriage, we see a per pound, Fig. 5 illustrates the rapid rate of decline in the rate of advance when measured increase in costs that occurred during the introagainst the rate of progress achieved through the duction of the Century Series, which paralleled mid-1950s. As we have reached higher and higher the period of rapid performance advances. The plateaus of air vehicle technology, sustaining the rate of increase in airframe costs per pound has rate of performance improvement has become more become decidedly more measured for subsequent and more difficult. If we continue to place a Mach 2 developments, as has the rate of perforhigh value on achieving air vehicle performance advances in the areas noted above, then the emerging trend in the extended amount of time required to improve performance should perhaps be the source of some concern.
S.
Whether we will have to accept a decline in the 4)
• • rate of performance advance will depend on a mul-CL.
tiplicity of factors that influence the development process, including cost and technical conUstraints, changing requirements driven by percep-E tions of the threat, and the attitudes and respon- for enhancing combat effectiveness. 
